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Abstract	Jacob	Muse:		Observations	of	Homeownership	in	the	United	States	from	World	War	II	to	Current	Day	(Under	the	direction	of	Dr.	Bonnie	Van	Ness)					 This	thesis	investigates	the	mechanisms	that	have	affected	homeownership	since	World	War	II.		Homeownership	rates	can	reflect	people’s	desire	to	own	homes	or	not	own	homes.		Therefore,	studying	the	homeownership	rates	will	give	me	a	better	opportunity	to	understand	how	the	residential	real	estate	market	operates.		Robert	Shiller’s	Homeownership	graph,	the	U.S.	Census	Bureau’s	Total	Housing	Inventory	Table	and	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	St.	Louis’	graph	of	the	homeownership	rate	drove	my	research.		Dating	back	to	World	War	II,	wherever	I	observed	a	significant	increase	or	decrease	in	homeownership,	I	wanted	to	explain	what	was	driving	the	increase	or	decrease.		In	conclusion,	I	observed	four	factors	that	seemed	to	have	the	most	significant	effect	on	homeownership:	economy,	interest	rates/mortgage	dynamics,	government	efforts,	and	demographics.		These	factors	did	not	always	seem	to	act	in	expected	manners,	and	the	changing	needs	or	desires	of	Americans	seemed	to	influence	homeownership	the	most.																												
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	 			 The	United	States’	residential	real	estate	market	is	driven	by	people’s	desire	to	buy	homes	or	not	buy	homes.		Recently,	since	the	housing	market	crash,	homeownership	has	been	on	the	decline,	and	Americans	do	not	seem	to	have	the	desire	to	own	homes	like	they	have	in	the	past.		I	wanted	to	understand	what	was	driving	this	decline.				Also,	I	believed	it	was	important	to	understand	what	has	driven	homeownership	rates	in	past	years,	specifically	since	World	War	II.		An	understanding	of	past	trends	would	be	beneficial	because	these	past	trends	may	shed	light	onto	what	is	driving	American’s	current	homeownership.	 Homeownership	rates	suggest	the	demand	that	people	have	for	homes;	and	when	homeownership	is	on	the	incline,	it	appears	that	more	people	want	to	own	homes.			A	detailed	look	into	why	or	why	not	Americans	purchase	homes	allows	those	in	the	residential	real	estate	to	better	understand	how	to	meet	the	needs	of	potential	homebuyers	and	be	more	successful	in	their	profession.		Since	World	War	II,	homeownership	rates	have	experienced	multiple	fluctuations	due	to	varying	reasons.			The	severity	of	the	current	decline	in	the	United	States’	homeownership	rates	suggests	a	change	is	occurring.		Recently,	many	Americans	are	shifting	towards	renting,	despite	the	increasing	cost	of	renting,	which	is	affecting	homeownership.		Since	the	Great	Recession	of	2007-2009,	obvious	factors,	such	as	the	economy	and	interest	rates,	seem	to	be	favorable	towards	owning	a	home.			Therefore,	there	must	be	other	factors	that	are	contributing	to	homeownership,	and	these	factors	may	have	been	at	work	during	other	times	in	America’s	history.			After	considering	the	
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details	of	the	residential	market	since	World	War	II	and	the	multitude	of	factors	that	affect	homeownership,	there	should	be	a	better	understanding	of	what	drives	homeownership	in	the	United	States,	which	may	help	explain	why	homeownership	has	steadily	declined	every	year	since	2006.		 		
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Chapter	2:	Increase	in	Homeownership	from	World	War	II	to	the	1980s	Crash	
	 The	end	of	World	War	II	brought	about	great	prosperity	to	the	United	States	economy.		Resulting	was	an	increase	in	homeownership.		World	War	II	officially	ended	in	1945,	and	the	United	States	was	at	an	interesting	point	in	history.		People	were	accustomed	to	a	bleak	economy;	one	where	spending	was	not	the	norm.		As	a	result,	once	the	war	ended,	people	had	a	built	up	demand	for	consumer	goods.		Americans	also	wanted	their	safety	back	and	to	live	the	American	dream—get	a	job,	buy	a	house,	marry,	and	raise	a	family.		Americans	began	to	place	a	strong	emphasis	on	families,	and	as	a	result	the	baby	boomer	generation	was	born.		These	were	babies,	76.4	million	of	them,	born	between	1946	and	1964.		This	large	addition	of	population	growth	would	later	create	a	huge	surge	in	housing	demand,	as	they	began	to	buy	homes	(Myers	and	Ryu,	2008).		Also,	with	the	end	of	the	war,	around	11	million	soldiers	were	released	from	active	duty.		The	government	made	it	possible	for	these	veterans	and	many	other	Americans	to	own	a	home	through	the	G.I.	Bill.			
The	government	put	two	plans	into	action,	the	G.I.	Bill	and	the	Housing	Act	of	1949,	which	would	create	a	huge	increase	in	homeownership	rates.		Figure	1	illustrates	the	enormous	increase	in	homeownership	rates.			
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Figure	1:	
	
Source:	Shiller,	Robert	(2007)	
	
In	1944	with	the	release	of	all	of	these	soldiers,	came	government	insured	loans	through	the	G.I.	Bill.		The	G.I.	Bill	provided	low	down	payment	requirements	that	made	it	easier	for	veterans	to	be	ready	and	able	to	buy	homes.		Fetters	(2010)	determined	that	the	Veterans	Administration	through	the	G.I.	Bill	was	responsible	for	a	10%	increase	in	homeownership.		Another	reason	for	the	increase	was	the	Housing	Act	of	1949.		President	Truman	gave	a	statement	after	signing	the	Act	that	informed	the	nation	of	its	purpose;	he	said,	“it	opens	up	the	prospect	of	decent	homes	in	wholesome	surroundings	for	low-income	families	now	living	in	the	
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squalor	of	the	slums	.	.	.	it	equips	the	Federal	Government,	for	the	first	time,	with	effective	means	for	aiding	cities	in	the	vital	task	of	clearing	slums	and	rebuilding	blighted	areas”	(Truman,	1949).		The	government	wanted	to	better	the	inner	cities	because	they	were	run	down,	and	many	people	were	leaving	the	cities.	
Increasing	suburbanization	also	bolstered	the	rise	in	homeownership	rates.		The	move	to	the	suburbs	was	a	result	of	a	few	factors:	“racial	fears,	affordable	housing,	and	desire	to	leave	decaying	cities”	(Ushistory.org).		Housing	was	more	affordable	in	the	suburbs	because	of	high	land	prices	in	urban	areas	that	were	a	result	of	cities	expansion	in	previous	years	(Freeman,	1999).		As	a	result	of	available	residential	real	estate	alternatives	(i.e.	suburbs),	Americans	were	able	to	buy	homes	that	met	their	needs.		The	emphasis	placed	on	residential	construction	in	the	suburbs	reflected	the	demand	people	had	for	homes	in	the	suburbs.			In	the	1950s,	according	to	Freeman	and	the	National	Real	Estate	Investor,	population	swelled	45%	in	the	suburbs,	and	residential	construction	in	the	suburbs	accounted	for	75%	of	total	construction	(Freeman,	1999).		The	United	States	residential	housing	market	was	undergoing	a	geographic	shift,	and	new	opportunities	for	housing	emerged	as	a	result.	
Simultaneously,	as	Americans	were	setting	out	to	achieve	security	and	the	American	dream,	the	United	States	economy	was	prospering.		In	May	1953,	civilian	unemployment	was	at	a	low	of	2.5%	(Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	St.	Louis).		The	United	States’	was	thriving	due	to	the	development	that	took	place	during	the	war;	many	developments,	such	as	industrial,	retail,	and	aviation	took	place	in	only	a	few	
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months	that	would	have	otherwise	taken	years	to	occur	(Freeman,	1999).		Americans	now	had	money	to	spend	that	they	did	not	previously	have	during	to	the	war.		Due	to	all	of	these	reasons,	plus	the	help	of	loans	and	the	suburbs,	demand	for	housing	increased	tremendously.		The	only	problem	was	the	real	estate	market	was	not	prepared	for	this	demand.	 	
The	more	affordable	housing,	booming	economy,	and	release	of	soldiers	made	it	more	accommodating	for	citizens	to	get	a	home,	but	the	residential	real	estate	market	was	not	prepared	for	the	influx	in	demand.		The	market	needed	to	correct	itself	to	supply	homes	to	meet	the	sudden	surge	in	demand.		The	real	estate	industry	had	been	dedicated	to	wartime	endeavors;	what	would	have	been	residential	development	was	focused	on	defense-related	plants	and	factories,	and	little	private	development	had	taken	place	(Freeman,	1999).		The	1950s	was	the	time	where	residential	construction	began	meeting	the	housing	demand.		William	Levitt	had	a	major	impact	in	regards	to	supplying	homes.		He	used	mass	production	techniques	that	he	had	developed	during	the	war	to	construct	suburban	homes;	within	one	year,	he	was	building	36	houses	per	day.		By	the	end	of	the	1950s,	there	were	no	less	than	15	million	houses	under	construction,	which	was	due	in	part	to	the	low	cost	mass	building	techniques.		With	supply	starting	to	meet	demand	came	more	increases	in	homeownership.	
	 The	housing	market	was	still	booming	into	the	1960s	with	an	upward	trend	in	homeownership	(U.S	Census	Bureau).		The	1960s,	also,	saw	its	first	major	federal	effort	to	apply	civil	rights	to	housing.		The	Housing	and	Urban	Development	Act	of	
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1965	initiated	a	leased	housing	program	to	make	privately	owned	housing	available	to	low-income	families.		Simultaneously,	with	the	HUD	Act	of	1965,	annual	rental	vacancy	rates	from	1965	until	1970	took	a	steep	dive,	which	can	be	seen	in	Figure	2.			
Figure	2:		Annual	Rental	Vacancy	Rates	
	
Source:	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	St.	Louis	
	
Over	this	6-year	period,	rates	fell	points,	from	8.5%	to	5.3%.		This	was	a	-37.65%	change,	and	I	assume	this	change	was	due	greatly	to	the	Housing	and	Urban	Development	Act	of	1965.	The	Housing	and	Urban	Development	Act	of	1965	allowed	low-income	families	to	now	enter	a	residential	housing	market,	where	they	could	afford	homes.		Also,	in	1965,	the	Census	Bureau	began	to	provide	more	detailed	data	of	Total	Housing	Inventory	in	1965;	measured	in	thousands,	there	were	64,213	total	housing	units,	and	of	those,	57,501	(89.5%)	were	occupied.		Out	of	the	57,501	that	were	occupied,	36,230	(63%)	were	owned	and	21,271	(37%)	were	rented.		From	
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1965	to	1969,	homeownership	rates	increased	every	year;	they	went	from	63%	to	64.3%,	respectively.		This	was	a	2.06%	increase	over	a	five-year	period	in	home	ownership.		Shortly	after,	in	1970,	detailed	data	on	median	home	prices	became	available.		Since	we	now	have	detailed	housing	data	available,	we	can	look	at	trends	with	the	availability	of	this	data.	
	 Entering	into	the	1970s	and	throughout	most	of	the	decade,	homeownership	rates	trended	slightly	upward.		Over	the	course	of	the	decade,	these	rates	experienced	a	+1.58%	change,	with	a	decline	in	only	one	year	when	rates	went	from	64.7%	to	64.6%.		To	put	those	percentages	into	perspective,	this	increase	resulted	in	roughly	10.52	million	new	homeowners	over	the	course	of	the	1970s.		This	increase	occurred	despite	the	two	recessions	that	occurred:	one	in	1970	and	another	from	the	fourth	quarter	of	1973	to	the	second	quarter	of	1975.		In	1970,	inflation	and	unemployment	soared.		Annual	inflation	rose	to	12.34%	in	1974	from	its	5.57%	level	in	1970	(CPI,	2016).		There	were	a	multitude	of	factors	that	contributed	to	the	recessions:	the	Vietnam	War,	the	War	on	Poverty,	the	1973-4	oil	embargo,	and	the	removal	of	the	gold	standard.	
The	Vietnam	War	along	with	the	War	on	Poverty	led	to	high	spending	for	the	U.S.	government.		This	spending	deteriorated	the	economy’s	prosperity	because	the	government	had	failed	to	raise	taxes	for	these	efforts,	which	led	to	escalating	inflation	(U.S.	Department	of	State).			Also,	since	the	government	had	not	been	able	to	raise	the	money	due	to	not	raising	taxes,	there	was	greater	government	borrowing;	this	meant	higher	interest	rates.			The	oil	embargo	also	attributed	to	the	
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inflation.		The	Organization	of	Petroleum	Exporting	Countries	issued	an	embargo	that	cut	off	oil	supply	from	Arab	countries,	which	is	where	the	United	States	received	a	majority	of	its	oil	(Myre,	2013).		This	embargo	resulted	in	an	increase	in	oil	prices.		Even	after	the	embargo	ended,	energy	prices	remained	higher	than	before	(“The	U.S.	Economy”).		Higher	energy	prices	resulted	in	higher	inflation.		Though	inflation	and	unemployment	were	increasing,	homeownership	did	not	take	a	significant	hit.	
Besides	the	recessions,	I	observed	three	surprising	facts	pertaining	to	the	increase	of	the	homeownership	rate.		First,	despite	a	6.98%	increase	in	median	inflation-adjusted	home	prices,	people	were	still	buying	homes	(S&P	Case-Shiller	Home	Price	Index).		In	1972,	65%	of	homes	had	at	least	3	bedrooms,	and	23%	had	4	bedrooms	or	more.		This	was	much	larger	than	the	2	or	less	bedrooms	that	represented	two-thirds	of	homes	in	the	1950s	(Alexander,	2000).		Alexander	(2000)	also	attributes	increasing	home	prices	to	the	increase	in	quality	of	life	enhancements	in	homes,	such	as	central	air	conditioners	and	dishwashers.		Lastly,	the	most	obvious	reason	for	an	increase	in	prices	is	the	rise	in	inflation	that	was	taking	place.		After	seeing	the	increase	in	home	size	and	addition	of	quality	of	life	enhancements	in	homes,	it	would	make	sense	that	home	prices	rose	because	people	were	getting	more	in	a	home	than	they	were	in	previous	years.	
Second,	monthly	mortgage	commitment	rates	on	a	30-year	fixed-rate	mortgage	were	increasing,	which	can	be	seen	in	Figure	3.		Higher	commitment	rates	suggests	higher	monthly	mortgage	payments.	
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Figure	3:	
	
Source:	Freddie	Mac	(2016)	
The	cost	of	borrowing	was	higher,	which	was	due	to	an	increase	in	the	Federal	Funds	Rate.		Even	though	it	was	more	expensive	to	take	out	a	mortgage	to	buy	a	home,	homeownership	was	increasing.	
		Third,	new	housing	starts	peaked	in	1972,	despite	a	recession.		In	1972,	new	privately	owned	housing	units	started	totaled	2.35	million	(U.S.	Census	Bureau).		It	was	bewildering	that	amongst	a	recession,	residential	housing	starts	were	at	the	highest	level	since	1959.		Clearly,	there	were	reasons	for	the	increase.		Construction	was	increased	because	of	tax	policies	and	baby	boomers.		Tax	policies	were	created	that	boosted	returns	on	all	real	estate	investment	income,	which	led	to	overbuilding	(Alexander).		Also,	baby	boomers	began	entering	the	housing	scene,	particularly	in	college	towns.		Colleges	and	universities	did	not	have	sufficient	housing	when	baby	
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boomers	began	entering	college	in	vast	amounts,	so	off	campus	living	became	increasingly	popular	(Alexander).		With	the	new	demand	for	off	campus	living	came	many	multifamily	unit	starts.		There	were	1.05	million	multifamily	starts	in	1972	that	accounted	for	44.45%	of	the	total	new	privately	owned	housing	units	started	(U.S.	Census	Bureau).		A	new	demand	had	risen	and	private	residential	construction	was	ready	to	meet	that	demand.	
Baby	boomers	also	aided	in	the	homeownership	increase	besides	just	occupying	homes	in	college	towns.		In	1978,	the	baby	boomers	ranged	between	14	and	32	years	old.		Also,	between	1970	and	1980,	the	population	of	those	25	years	and	older	increased	by	22.9	million,	which	was	due	to	the	influx	of	the	baby	boomer	generation	(Myers	&	Ryu,	2008).		This	growth	was	more	than	twice	the	amount	seen	between	1960	and	1970.		According	to	Zillow	(2015),	between	1974	and	1979,	the	median	age	of	a	homebuyer	was	29	years	old.		Since	many	of	the	baby	boomers	were	around	this	29-year-old	mark,	then	many	were	now	entering	the	housing	market,	which	increased	the	pool	of	potential	homebuyers.		Also,	despite	increasing	home	prices	and	unemployment,	homeownership	was	still	relatively	as	affordable	as	it	had	been	in	the	recent	decades.		In	1980,	Glenn	H.	Miller	(1980)	did	a	study	on	housing	affordability.		Below,	Figure	4	shows	a	comparison	between	house	prices	and	family	income.		This	data	for	median	house	prices	is	only	for	houses	actually	sold	during	that	year.	Only	in	the	second	half	of	the	decade	did	he	find	that	home	prices	had	risen	more	rapidly	than	family	income.		This	suggests	affordability	was	not	an	issue	from	1970	to	1975,	but	housing	affordability	soon	became	a	problem	in	the	late	1970s	into	the	1980s.		The	1970s	ended	with	an	upward	trend	in	
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homeownership,	but	this	increase	soon	changed	with	the	recessions	of	the	early	1980s.	
Figure	4	
	
Source:	Miller,	Glenn	(1980)	
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Chapter	3:	Homeownership	During	the	1980s	And	Until	The	Formation	Of	Our	
Most	Recent	Housing	Bubble	
	The	beginning	of	the	1980s	was	marked	by	the	worst	economic	downturn	since	the	Great	Depression	(Sablik,	2013).		This	economic	downturn	was	reflected	in	the	U.S.	homeownership	rates.		From	1980	to	1986,	homeownership	rates	fell	every	year.		In	1980,	65.6%	of	households	were	owner-occupied,	but	by	1986,	only	63.8%	were	owner-occupied;	this	was	a	decrease	of	1.8%	(U.S	Census	Bureau).		A	decrease	over	seven	years	had	not	been	seen	since	the	Great	Depression.			I	attribute	this	decline	in	the	homeownership	rates	to	the	decreasing	affordability	of	homes	and	mortgages	and	also	an	overall	troubled	economy.				 The	early	1980s	recession	was	a	result	of	a	strict	monetary	policy	in	hopes	to	reduce	rapidly	rising	inflation.		Inflation	had	been	high	during	the	1970s,	and	it	continued	into	the	early	1980s.		Therefore,	the	government	decided	to	combat	this	inflation	by	raising	the	Federal	Funds	Rate	(FFR).		Figure	5	shows	how	greatly	the	FFR	increased	from	the	late	1970s	until	its	peak	in	1981.									
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Figure	5:	Federal	Funds	Rate	
	Source:	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	St.	Louis		
	
In	1981,	the	Federal	Funds	Rate	reached	16.38%.		As	a	result,	“high	interest	rates	put	pressures	on	sectors	of	the	economy	reliant	on	borrowing”	(Sablik,	2013).		Many	homebuyers	and	mortgage	lenders	are	reliant	on	borrowing.		As	a	result	of	these	pressures,	conventional	mortgages	were	more	expensive.		More	expensive	mortgages	made	it	harder	for	many	Americans	to	purchase	a	home.		To	put	it	in	perspective,	Figure	6	shows	the	monthly	mortgage	payment	for	various	years	before	the	recession,	during	the	recession,	and	after	the	recession.	
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Figure	6:	Average	Monthly	Payment	for	30-Year	Fixed	Rate	Mortgage	
	 1975	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1987	
Interest	 9.05%	 13.74%	 16.63%	 16.04%	 13.24%	 10.21%	
Median	
Home	
Price	
	$141,662	 	$160,656		 	$154,440	 	$149,395	 	$150,002	 	$171,841	
Loan	
Amount	
$113,330	 $128,525	 $123,552	 $119,516	 $120,002	 $137,473	
Monthly	
Payment	
$916	 $1,496	 $1,724	 $1,611	 $1,350	 $1,229		
Source:	Mac,	Freddie	&	S&P	Case-Shiller	Home	Price	Index	
	Using	real	median	home	prices	from	the	S&P	Case-Shiller	Home	Price	Index	and	mortgage	interest	rates	from	Freddie	Mac,	I	can	calculate	monthly	payments	after	a	20%	down	payment.		Figure	6	shows	that	a	monthly	mortgage	payment	in	1980	was	approzimately	63%	more	than	it	was	five	years	prior.		Even	five	years	after	the	recession,	monthly	mortgage	payments	were	34%	higher	than	in	1975.		Although,	average	mortgage	payments	had	started	to	become	more	affordable,	they	were	still	high	due	to	extremely	high	interest	rates.		These	high	interest	rates	made	it	more	difficult	for	Americans	to	purchase	a	home.		 We	can	also	get	another	look	at	how	unaffordable	homes	were	during	most	of	the	1980s.		The	Housing	Affordability	Index	(HAI)	shows	the	affordability	of	housing	for	a	typical	family;	a	value	of	100	means	a	median-income	family	has	sufficient	income	to	purchase	a	median-priced	existing	home	(Dr.	Econ,	2003).		Incorporated	in	the	HAI	are	changes	in	key	variables	that	affect	home	affordability:	
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housing	prices,	interest	rates,	and	income	(Dr.	Econ,	2003).		Figure	7	displays	the	HAI.	 	Figure	7	
	Source:	Dr.	Econ	(2003)		Figure	7	shows	that,	roughly	between	1979	and	1987,	a	median-income	family	had	insufficient	income	to	purchase	a	typical	home.		Home	prices	were	not	the	reason	for	this	decreasing	affordability.		From	a	peak	in	1979	until	1983,	inflation-adjusted	home	prices	fell;	afterwards,	prices	remained	fairly	stable	until	1985,	and	then	they	rose	until	1989	(S&P	Case-Shiller	Home	Price	Index).		The	stability	of	home	prices	suggests	that	home	prices	were	not	one	of	the	key	variables	affecting	affordability.		
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Therefore,	I	attributed	income	and	interest	rates	to	be	the	cause	of	unaffordable	homes.		With	this	decrease	in	affordability	of	homes,	one	would	expect	homeownership	rates	to	fall.	 	Also,	with	the	recession	and	increasing	interest	rates	came	an	increase	in	unemployment.		In	1982,	the	Civilian	Unemployment	Rate	peaked	at	9.7%,	which	was	the	highest	level	since	1948	(Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	St.	Louis).		More	people	unemployed	meant	fewer	people	who	had	the	necessary	financials	to	service	a	mortgage.		Therefore,	increased	unemployment	would	put	a	damper	on	homeownership.		After	looking	into	these	many	factors,	we	see	that	the	decrease	in	homeownership	from	1980	until	1986	can	be	attributed	mainly	to	high	interest	rates,	but	also	a	struggling	economy.				 Another	event	worth	mentioning	from	the	1980s	is	the	introduction	of	adjustable-rate	mortgages	(ARMs).		I	believe	these	mortgages	affected	homeownership	in	the	1980s	and	also	in	later	years.		ARMs	came	about	to	help	Savings	and	Loan	Institutions	(S	&	Ls).		S	&	Ls		are	conventional	residential	mortgage	lenders.		Since	1934,	public	policy	had	encouraged	S	&	Ls	to	make	progressively	longer	term	fixed-rate	mortgages	with	progressively	smaller	down	payments	(Kaufman,	1995).		In	a	fixed-rate	mortgage	situation,	if	interest	rates	increased,	then	the	lenders	would	lose	money.		So	when	interest	rates	increased	rapidly	in	the	late	70s	and	into	the	80s,	85%	of	all	S	&	Ls	were	losing	money	by	1982	(Kaufman,	1995).		As	a	result,	regulators	intervened	and	introduced	ARMs.		During	times	of	rising	interest	rates,	like	the	1980s,	an	adjustable-rate	mortgage	makes	your	initial	monthly	mortgage	payment	more	affordable.		However,	these	payments	
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may	not	stay	affordable.		If	interest	rates	increase,	then	mortgage	rates	adjust,	and	payments	become	more	expensive.		Vice	versa,	if	interest	rates	decrease,	then	mortgage	rates	adjust	downward,	and	payments	may	become	more	affordable,	which	is	why	some	borrowers	like	ARMs.		Other	borrowers	like	ARMs	because	a	low	initial	rate	allows	borrowers	to	afford	an	initial	monthly	payment	that	they	might	not	be	able	to	afford	under	a	fixed-rate	mortgage.		Lastly,	banks	like	ARMs	because	ARMs	allow	banks	to	reduce	part	of	their	interest	rate	risk,	but	there	can	be	a	trade	off.		ARMs	can	be	much	riskier	than	conventional	30-year	mortgages	due	to	low	teaser	rates	and	uncertain	interest	rates,	so	these	mortgages	expose	borrowers	to	higher	default	risk.			Borrowers	may	be	more	likely	to	default	on	their	loans	if	rates	increase,	or	their	payments	become	more	expensive.		Essentially	ARMs	helped	Savings	and	Loan	Institutions	reduce	their	interest	rate	risk	in	a	time	of	unstable	interest	rates	and	allowed	borrowers	an	alternative	to	conventional	fixed-rate	mortgages.			These	alternative	mortgages	seemed	to	have	increased	homeownership	because	they	made	it	appear	that	many	borrowers	could	afford	the	mortgages,	even	if	they	could	not	in	the	long	run.		Borrowers	took	advantage	of	these	ARMs	in	the	1980s,	and	ARMs	became	viable	options	for	borrowers	(Peek,	1990).		Figure	8	shows	adjustable-rate	mortgage’s	total	percentage	of	total	loans	in	the	second	half	of	the	1980s.			 		
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	Figure	8:	ARM’s	Percentage	of	Total	Loans	
	Source:	Green,	Richard	&	Wachter,	Susan	(2005)		Figure	8	shows	that	ARMs	use	was	increasing	as	a	percentage	of	total	loans	in	the	latter	half	of	the	1980s.		I	believe	the	use	of	ARMs	along	with	much	help	from	lower	interest	rates	aided	in	ending	the	decline	in	homeownership	in	the	80s	because	it	made	mortgages	more	affordable.		The	introduction	of	ARMs	seemed	like	a	good	decision	in	the	1980s,	but	proved	to	have	negative	effects	in	later	years	when	interest	rates	were	much	lower.		 Following	the	significant	drop	in	the	homeownership	rate	in	the	beginning	of	1980s	was	fairly	stagnant	growth	from	1986	until	1994.			Homeownership	ranged	from	63.8%	to	64.5%	during	that	time	period	(U.S	Census	Bureau).			In	the	later	half	of	the	1990s,	the	stagnant	growth	ended,	and	the	formation	of	a	housing	bubble	began.			
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Chapter	4:		The	Housing	Bubble	of	the	21st	Century	In	the	late	1990s,	the	housing	industry	in	the	United	States	was	on	the	verge	of	a	housing	bubble	that	ultimately	burst	in	2006.			This	bubble	was	not	the	first	the	United	States	had	seen,	but	it	was	a	major	one	and	arguably	the	largest	since	the	Great	Depression.		Home	prices	were	fairly	stable	throughout	most	of	the	1990s;	the	S&P	Case-Shiller	Home	Price	Index	shows	that	home	prices	increased	by	roughly	8.3	percent	from	the	1st	quarter	of	1990	to	the	1st	quarter	of	1997.		Shortly	after,	home	prices	increased	rapidly;	they	peaked	in	the	2nd	quarter	of	2006,	and	prices	were	over	132%	higher	than	in	the	1st	quarter	of	1997	(Holt,	2009).		For	roughly	nine	years,	home	prices	continually	increased.		Simultaneously,	despite	increasing	home	prices,	homeownership	increased	every	year	from	1994	until	2004	and	remained	high	for	2005	and	2006	(U.S.	Census	Bureau).		Many	causes	contributed	to	this	bubble,	and	many	people	believe	that	the	bursting	of	this	housing	bubble	is	the	cause	for	the	conditions	of	our	current	residential	real	estate	market.		It	seems	that	four	major	factors	contributed	the	most	to	the	housing	bubble	and	credit	crisis	that	resulted	with	some	factors	contributing	more	than	others	(Holt,	2009).		These	four	factors	are	monetary	policy,	adjustable-rate	mortgages,	relaxed	standards	for	mortgages,	and	irrational	exuberance.		 Entering	into	the	1990s,	the	Federal	Reserve	made	borrowing	cheaper	than	it	had	been	in	recent	years	in	an	attempt	to	strengthen	the	economy.	The	Fed’s	monetary	policy	post-1980s	resulted	in	the	Federal	Funds	Rate	being	much	lower	than	it	had	been	recently,	which	can	be	seen	in	Figure	9.		
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Figure	9:	Federal	Funds	Rate	1980-2006	
	Source:	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	St.	Louis		The	resulting	short-term	interest	rates	due	to	the	FFR	made	it	more	appealing	for	potential	homebuyers	to	get	an	adjustable-rate	mortgage	(ARM).		 An	ARM	was	more	appealing	than	a	fixed-rate	mortgage	(FRM)	because	of	the	rapid	increase	in	home	prices	and	the	structure	of	interest	rates.		ARMs’	initial	monthly	payments	are	tied	to	short-term	interest	rates,	while	FRM’s	initial	monthly	payments	are	tied	to	longer-term	interest	rates.		Home	prices	were	increasing	faster	than	household	income,	so	many	homebuyers	were	unable	to	afford	mortgage	payments	under	a	FRM,	but	an	ARM	could	provide	a	buyer	with	a	lower	initial	monthly	payment	since	short-term	interest	rates	were	lower	than	long-term	interest	rates	(Holt,	2009).			The	average	commitment	rate	for	30-year	FRMs	had	
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fallen,	but	it	was	not	as	low	as	short-term	interest	rates.		These	two	rates	are	illustrated	in	Figure	10.			 	Figure	10:	Commitment	Rate	for	30-Year	FRM	vs.	Initial	Commitment	Rate	for	ARM	
Year	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 2002	 2003	 2004	 2005	 2006	
FRM	 7.93	 7.81	 7.60	 6.94	 7.44	 8.05	 6.97	 6.54	 5.83	 5.84	 5.87	 6.41	
ARM	 5.84	 5.30	 5.46	 5.35	 4.97	 6.24	 3.89	 1.67	 1.13	 1.35	 3.21	 4.96		 Source:	Mac,	Freddie	&	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	St.	Louis		In	every	year	from	1995	until	the	crash,	the	rate	for	beginning	payments	on	ARMs	was	significantly	lower,	but	there	was	a	problem:	“when	the	interest	rate	on	the	mortgage	adjusted	upward	(typically	after	two	years),	the	higher	mortgage	payments	proved	unmanageable	for	many	home	buyers”	(Holt,	2009).		Again,	like	the	1980s,	ARMs	allowed	more	people	to	get	mortgages,	which	increased	demand	and	drove	up	home	prices;	but	ARMs	also	resulted	in	an	increase	in	homeownership.		ARMs	also	played	another	role	in	increasing	homeownership	and	home	prices.		 Alternatives	to	standard	ARMs	were	also	available	during	this	time	period.		There	were	interest-only	ARMs,	40-year	amortization	ARMs,	negative	amortization	ARMs,	and	pay-option	ARMs.		They	had	even	lower	initial	monthly	payments,	which	is	exhibited	in	Figure	11.				
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Figure	11:	Initial	Monthly	Payments	Under	Different	Types	of	Mortgages	
	Source:	Bernanke,	Ben	(2010)		Figure	11	shows	initial	monthly	payments	from	2003	until	2006.			Figure	11	shows	how	much	cheaper	these	alternatives	were	than	a	standard	fixed-rate	mortgage	or	even	an	adjustable-rate	mortgage.		The	availability	of	these	alternative	mortgages	proved	to	be	very	important;	and	as	many	have	recognized,	the	alternative	mortgages	were	key	contributors	to	the	housing	bubble	(Bernanke,	2010).		Again,	these	different	types	of	mortgages	broadened	the	pool	of	borrowers	who	could	afford	these	initial	monthly	payments,	but	there	was	the	possibility	that	these	borrowers	would	struggle	with	payments	once	the	payment	adjusted	later	in	the	loan	term.		As	a	result	of	cheaper	ARM	alternatives,	homeownership	continued	to	increase.	
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	 Another	factor,	relaxed	standards	for	mortgage	loans,	also	increased	the	number	of	potential	homebuyers	who	were	able	to	get	a	mortgage.		There	is	a	lot	of	controversy	over	what	or	who	actually	caused	these	loose	standards.		The	government	seems	to	be	the	culprit,	according	to	most.		According	to	Peter	Wallison	(2009),	“the	regulators,	in	both	the	Clinton	and	Bush	administrations,	were	the	enforcers	of	the	reduced	lending	standards	that	were	essential	to	growth	in	home	homeownership	and	the	housing	bubble.”		Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac,	a	government-sponsored	enterprise	(GSE),	had	a	lot	to	do	with	the	relaxed	standards	and	increase	in	sub-prime	mortgage	loans.		In	1999,	the	New	York	Times	explained	this	new	change:	“Fannie	Mae,	the	nation’s	biggest	underwriter	of	home	mortgages,	has	been	under	increasing	pressure	from	the	Clinton	Administration	to	expand	mortgage	loans	among	low	and	moderate	income	people.”		There	did	not	seem	to	be	any	problem	with	the	reduced	lending	standards	because	everyone,	lenders	and	borrowers,	thought	home	prices	were	going	to	continue	to	increase.		Borrowers	were	given	mortgages	approved	by	regulators	under	Clinton	and	Bush	that	they	would	never	be	able	to	pay	over	the	entire	loan	term,	but	they	were	given	these	loans	on	the	expectation	that	accumulating	home	equity	would	allow	for	refinancing	into	more	fitting	mortgages.		Although	these	loans	allowed	for	an	increase	in	homeownership	in	the	U.S.,	they	created	more	sub-prime	loans,	which	carried	more	risk	due	to	the	higher	possibility	of	default	than	a	conventional	mortgage	would	have.			Lastly	is	the	irrational	exuberance	factor.		Robert	Shiller	(2005)	summarizes	the	term	to	mean	a	“heightened	state	of	speculative	fervor.”		Americans	thought	that	
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home	prices	would	continue	to	increase;	they	did	not	see	a	decline	coming	in	the	foreseeable	future.		Therefore,	people	kept	buying	houses,	whether	they	could	really	afford	them	or	not,	because	they	believed	the	value	of	these	homes	would	continue	to	increase.		If	these	homeowners	couldn’t	make	their	payments,	then	they	believed	they	would	be	able	to	sell	the	house	for	more	than	they	paid	for	it.		Many	people	had	a	lot	of	faith	in	rising	home	prices,	and	when	home	prices	fell,	the	United	States	went	was	not	prepared	for	a	decline	in	home	prices.			
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Chapter	5:	The	Bursting	of	the	Housing	Bubble	
	 The	housing	bubble	burst	in	2006	when	home	prices	started	to	fall,	and	foreclosure	rates	started	to	increase.		As	a	result,	homeownership	fell.		The	increase	in	the	homeownership	rate	leveled	off	in	2004,	and	then	in	2006	began	a	steady	decline	(U.S	Census	Bureau).		From	2006	to	2009,	there	was	a	-2.03	percent	change	in	homeownership.		Declining	home	prices	and	increased	foreclosures	were	what	caused	bubble	to	burst.		Many	Americans	lost	their	homes	and	could	not	afford	new	ones	under	changing	mortgage	conditions.			
	 Homebuyers	became	unable	to	service	their	mortgage	payments,	which	resulted	in	default.		As	soon	as	housing	prices	stopped	rising,	foreclosures	began	rising;	nominal	home	prices	dropped	1.4%	in	the	six	months	from	the	second	quarter	of	2006	to	the	fourth	quarter	of	2006,	and	foreclosure	start	rates	increased	by	43%	simultaneously	(Liebowitz,	2008).		From	2006	to	2007,	the	percentage	of	loans	in	foreclosure	process	at	year-end	went	from	1.2%	to	2.0%.		The	foreclosure	rate	rose	even	higher	in	2008	and	2009	to	3.3%	and	4.6%,	respectively.		Foreclosures	increased	because	home	prices	had	started	to	decrease,	which	destroyed	equity	for	many.		Simultaneously,	as	foreclosures	were	increasing,	home	prices	were	declining.		Figure	12	shows	the	relationship	between	real	home	prices	and	foreclosure	rates.	
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Figure	12:	Real	Home	Prices	vs.	Foreclosure	Rates	
	
Source:	S&P	Case-Shiller	Home	Price	Index		Figure	12	plots	home	prices	along	with	the	foreclosure	rate.		It	appears	that	in	2006	when	real	home	prices	begin	falling,	foreclosure	rates	simultaneously	begin	rising.		With	decreasing	home	equity	due	to	falling	home	prices	came	an	increase	in	foreclosures.		This	loss	of	equity	in	homes	eliminated	the	option	of	homeowners	being	able	to	borrow	against	their	home	equity	when	they	could	not	meet	their	monthly	mortgage	payment	(Baker,	2008).		Also,	many	of	these	homeowners	realized	they	owed	more	than	the	value	of	their	home	now	that	prices	had	decreased,	so	they	walked	away	from	their	mortgages	(Baker,	2008).		With	the	defaults	and	falling	home	prices	came	a	credit	crisis.		 The	banks	were	hit	hard	during	the	bursting	of	the	housing	bubble.		They	were	left	with	many	foreclosed	homes	and	defaulted	loans,	and	these	foreclosed	
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homes	were	not	easy	to	sell.		Since	so	many	foreclosures	were	taking	place	in	a	small	time	period,	there	were	many	houses	on	the	market.		Since	supply	was	much	greater	than	demand,	prices	fell	even	further.		So	not	only	did	banks	have	trouble	selling	these	homes,	they	also	had	to	sell	at	distressed	prices.		As	a	result,	banks	began	to	tighten	lending	standards	and	require	larger	down	payments	(Baker,	2008).			Tightened	lending	standards	and	larger	down	payments	applied	to	both	first-time	homebuyers	and	existing	homebuyers	(Baker,	2009).			As	a	result,	homeownership	rates	fell	into	a	downward	spiral.	
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Chapter	6:	Post-Housing	Crash	
	 The	bursting	of	the	real	estate	bubble	has	left	a	substantial	impact	on	our	current	market	in	the	United	States.		Once	homeownership	and	home	prices	started	falling	drastically	in	2006,	the	residential	home	market	began	undergoing	a	major	transition.		In	2006,	the	homeownership	rate	was	68.8%.		Fast-forward	to	2015,	the	homeownership	rate	is	63.7%,	which	is	a	–7.41	percent	change	since	2006	(U.S.	Census	Bureau).		This	decline	is	the	biggest	since	the	Great	Depression	with	no	sign	of	increase	over	these	10	years,	and	the	United	States	has	seen	no	sign	of	homeownership	rebounding.		From	after	the	Great	Depression	until	now,	I	have	observed	four	major	factors	that	seem	to	drive	homeownership	that	may	explain	the	current	decline	in	homeownership:	the	economy,	interest	rates/mortgage	dynamics,	government	policies,	and	demographics.		If	these	factors	are	not	able	to	explain	the	current	decline,	then	we	may	need	to	consider	other	factors.		 Since	the	Great	Recession,	the	economy	has	been	improving.		GDP	has	increased	every	year,	except	one,	since	2006,	and	GDP’s	growth	rate	was	at	a	two-year	high	of	2.9%	in	the	3rd	quarter	of	2016	(Trading	Economics,	2017).		Also,	unemployment	began	decreasing	in	2010	and	has	decreased	all	the	way	to	2015,	when	the	civilian	unemployment	rate	was	5.3%.		Another	economic	factor	contributing	to	our	current	residential	market	is	home	prices.		After	the	peak	at	$276,403	in	median	home	prices	in	2006,	prices	fell	to	$186,673	in	2011	(S&P	Case-Shiller	Home	Price	Index).		Since	2012,	home	prices	have	increased	to	roughly	$190,000,	but	this	figure	is	nowhere	near	the	peak	10	years	ago	(S&P	Case-Shiller	Home	Price	Index).			Generally,	a	strong	economy	and	increasing	prices	would	
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suggest	stronger	demand,	but	there	does	not	seem	to	be	stronger	demand	as	homeownership	has	been	on	the	decline	for	the	past	10	years.		Therefore,	the	economy	does	not	explain	why	homeownership	rates	are	still	falling.	
	 Interest	rates	and	mortgage	dynamics	also	do	not	suggest	declining	homeownership.		The	Federal	Funds	Rate	has	been	close	to	zero	since	2009,	fluctuating	between	0.18%	and	0.09%	(Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	St.	Louis).		This	low	FFR	suggests	very	low	short-term	interest	rates.		Along	with	low	short-term	interest	rates	are	low	annual	average	commitment	rates	on	30-year	fixed-rate	mortgages.		The	average	commitment	rates	on	30-year	fixed-rate	mortgages	are	illustrated	in	Figure	13.	
Figure	13:	Annual	Average	Commitment	Rates	on	a	30-Year	Fixed-Rate	Mortgage	
	
Source:	Mac,	Freddie	(2016)	
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Figure	13	shows	that	the	annual	average	commitment	rate	on	30-year	fixed-rate	mortgages	is	the	lowest	it	has	been	since	1972.		The	most	recent	commitment	rate	in	2015	was	3.85%,	which	is	1.98%	lower	than	any	rate	observed	in	roughly	43	years.		With	low	commitment	rates	and	falling	home	prices	from	2006	until	2011,	it	would	be	assumed	that	mortgages	are	more	affordable	than	in	years	past.		But	these	low	commitment	rates	on	30-year	fixed-rate	mortgages	have	not	seemed	to	boost	homeownership.		In	the	past,	with	low	commitment	rates,	we	have	seen	an	increase	in	homeownership.		But,	despite	the	current	cheaper	borrowing	costs,	homeownership	has	continued	to	decline.				 Another	factor	that	has	influenced	homeownership	rates	in	the	past	are	mortgage	dynamics,	specifically	qualifications	for	mortgages.		Our	current	mortgage	dynamics	would	suggest	an	increase	in	homeownership	rates	due	to	easier	qualifications	for	loans,	but	that	has	not	been	the	case	since	the	bursting	of	the	housing	bubble	or	the	Recession	of	2007-09.		Credit	requirements	have	been	reduced,	which	means	that	it	is	easier	for	potential	homebuyers	to	qualify	for	a	loan.		Ellie	Mae	(2015)	reported	that	the	average	FICO	score	fell	to	723	on	all	closed	loans,	which	was	the	lowest	score	since	the	group	started	recording	in	2011.		Ellie	Mae	(2015)	also	reported	that	lenders	are	approving	borrowers	with	higher	debt-to-income	(DTI)	ratios.		Higher	DTI	means	borrowers	have	a	higher	probability	of	default.		The	ease	in	mortgage	underwriting	standards	seems	to	be	the	result	of	government	policies.		In	2016,	John	Silvia	of	Wells	Fargo	told	the	New	York	Post	that	there	has	been	a	“promotion	of	policy	to	push	firms	to	seek	riskier	products	to	promote	growth”	(Sperry,	2016).		Despite	efforts	to	bolster	homeownership,	
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through	loosening	underwriting	standards	and	slashing	credit	requirements,	the	number	of	Americans	buying	homes	is	still	declining.		 Again,	the	government	has	enacted	certain	home	policies	following	the	burst	of	the	housing	bubble	to	try	to	encourage	homeownership	growth.		The	Housing	and	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008	was	a	policy	enacted	in	2008	to	try	to	boost	homeownership	and	save	homeowners	at	risk	of	foreclosure.		The	Housing	and	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008	consisted	of	three	parts:	Federal	Housing	Finance	Regulatory	Reform	Act	of	2008,	HOPE	for	Homeowners	Act	of	2008,	and	the	Foreclosure	Prevention	Act	of	2008.		The	Federal	Housing	Finance	Regulatory	Reform	Act	of	2008’s	purpose	was	to	create	a	new	and	different	regulator	for	government	sponsored	enterprises	(GSEs),	such	as	Fannie	Mae,	Freddie	Mac,	and	Federal	Home	Loan	Banks	that	would	ensure	safe	and	sound	operations	of	GSEs.		This	act	also	created	a	program	that	would	help	at	least	400,000	families	at	risk	of	losing	their	homes	to	foreclosure	by	providing	new	FHA	loans,	where	lenders	take	deep	discounts.		Second,	the	HOPE	for	Homeowners	Act	of	2008	allowed	distressed	homeowners	at	risk	of	losing	their	homes	to	refinance	their	loans	at	significant	discounts	in	return	for	sharing	future	price	appreciations	with	the	FHA.		Lastly,	the	Foreclosure	Prevention	Act	of	2008	did	multiple	things.		This	act	increased	the	FHA	loan	limit,	assisted	communities	devastated	by	foreclosures,	gave	pre-foreclosure	counseling,	created	standard	property	tax	deductions,	and	created	a	tax	credit	for	the	purchase	of	homes	in	foreclosure.		Despite	the	efforts	put	forth	to	increase	homeownership	there	does	not	appear	to	be	an	increase	in	homeownership	in	the	roughly	eight	years	since	these	programs	have	been	introduced.		There	is	one	
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program	that	was	introduced	in	late	2015,	by	Fannie	Mae	that	may	help	increase	homeownership	in	years	to	come.		This	program	is	HomeReady.		 HomeReady	was	designed	to	help	low-	to	moderate-income	borrowers	through	a	new,	alternative	type	of	mortgage.		HomeReady’s	mission	is	“to	help	lenders	confidently	serve	today’s	market	of	creditworthy,	low-	to	moderate-income	borrowers,	with	expanded	eligibility	for	financing	homes	in	low-income	communities”	(Fannie	Mae,	2015).		This	mortgage	has	many	features.		HomeReady	offers	low	down	payments,	where	borrowers	can	get	up	to	97%	loan-to-value	financing	for	home	purchases	using	flexible	sources	of	funds.		Flexible	sources	of	funds	means	that	borrowers	are	not	required	to	use	their	own	funds;	borrowers	can	use	non-borrower	household	members’	income	instead.		Also,	HomeReady	supposedly	uses	flexible	credit.		Using	rental	unit	and	boarder	income	is	one	example	of	the	flexible	credit	options.		Rental	unit	and	boarder	income	means	that	a	homeowner	can	use	rental	income	from	the	property	as	qualifying	income	for	a	HomeReady	mortgage.			HomeReady	mortgages	make	getting	a	mortgage	easier	for	low-	to	moderate-income	families,	but	it	is	yet	to	be	determined	if	borrowers	will	be	able	to	service	these	loans	in	the	long	run.		Since	the	project	was	introduced	roughly	a	year	ago,	it	is	hard	to	know	the	effects	on	homeownership.		So	far,	no	government	policies	have	seemed	to	result	in	an	increase	in	homeownership	rates.				 Demographics	is	the	last	of	the	four	major	factors:	economy,	interest	rates/mortgage	dynamics,	government	policies,	and	demographics;	and	it	is	the	only	factor	that	seems	actually	be	able	to	describe	the	decrease	in	homeownership.		Demographics	consist	of	characteristics	that	describe	the	population,	in	this	case	the	
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United	States’	population.		Within	demographics,	I	will	consider	the	changing	mindset	of	Americans	and	affordability	related	to	income.		 Many	Americans	are	changing	their	views	toward	homeownership.		A	group	changing	the	dynamics	of	homeownership	is	the	Millenials.		Millenials	are	those	born	between	1980	and	the	mid-2000s,	and	they	seem	to	be	placing	less	emphasis	on	owning	a	home	than	past	generations.		The	oldest	Millenials	would	have	been	around	26	years	old	when	the	housing	market	crashed	and	the	Great	Recession	started.		As	a	result,	the	forefront	of	Millenials	were	entering	the	housing	market	in	troubled	times.		For	that	reason	alone,	they	would	have	altered	views	towards	homeownership,	since	they	witnessed,	first	hand,	how	many	people	lost	homes	and	lost	money	when	the	housing	market	crashed.		These	Millenials	also	have	financial	troubles	of	their	own;	they	had	outstanding	student	loan	debt	surpassing	one-trillion	in	mid-2014,	and	many	rely	on	parents	for	financial	support	more	so	than	generations	in	the	past	have	(White	House	Council	of	Economic	Advisers,	2014).			The	share	of	18-34	year	olds	living	with	their	parents	has	increased	from	28%	in	2007	to	31%	in	2014	(White	House	Council	of	Economic	Advisers,	2014).		Also,	Millenials	tend	to	get	married	later;	in	2013,	only	30%	of	20-34	year	olds	were	married	compared	to	77%	in	1960	(White	House	Council	of	Economic	Advisers,	2014).		The	White	House	Council	of	Economic	Advisers	(2014)	found	that	Millenials	are	delaying	family	formation	and	less	likely	to	be	homeowners	than	young	adults	in	previous	generations.		The	changing	dynamics	of	America’s	youngest	generation	may	be	contributing	to	the	current	decline	in	homeownership.	
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	 Many	think	that	housing	affordability	is	an	issue	contributing	to	our	current	decline	in	homeownership	rates,	but	that	is	not	the	case.		Housing	is	actually	more	affordable	than	it	was	from	1985-2000.		According	to	Svenja	Gudell	(2016),	at	the	end	of	2015,	the	average	American	making	the	nation’s	median	annual	income	($55,589)	trying	to	buy	the	typical	American	home	($186,000)	could	expect	to	pay	15%	of	their	income	towards	a	monthly	mortgage	payment.		The	average	percentage	income	an	American	would	have	paid	from	1985-2000	was	21%;	so	overall,	homes	are	actually	quite	affordable	compared	to	past	years	(Gudell,	2016).		Although,	homes	are	collectively	more	affordable,	there	is,	however,	an	affordability	issue	among	Americans	who	are	making	the	least	amount	of	income.		These	low	income	Americans	may	be	contributing	to	a	decline	in	homeownership.		Figure	14	shows	the	income	problem	that	has	arisen.														
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Figure	14:	Income	by	Tier		 	
	 	
Source:	Gudell,	Svenja	(2016)	
	
Figure	14	illustrates	that	bottom	tier	Americans	are	experiencing	roughly	no	income	growth,	which	makes	it	harder	for	them	to	purchase	a	home	than	top	tier	Americans.		By	2014,	low-income	households	purchasing	a	lower-priced	home	spent	14%	points	more	of	their	income	on	a	mortgage	than	high-income	people	purchasing	a	higher-priced	home	(Gudell,	2016).		So	while	housing	affordability	does	not	seem	to	be	an	issue	as	a	whole,	it	may	be	a	problem	for	some	demographics.		Low-income	households	struggling	to	afford	mortgages	may	be	contributing	to	the	current	decline	in	homeownership	rates	in	the	U.S.		
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	 Americans	also	have	a	different	view	towards	renting	than	in	recent	years.		In	2015,	renters	made	up	36.3%	of	total	housing	inventory	compared	to	31.1%	in	2005,	just	prior	to	the	crash	(U.S	Census	Bureau).		Renters	are	not	just	increasing	in	a	particular	age	group;	renters	are	increasing	among	most	age	groups.		The	increase	in	renters	among	all	age	groups	is	illustrated	in	Figure	15.		Figure	15:	Change	in	Share	of	Households	Renting	(2004-2103)	
	Source:	Joint	Center	for	Housing	Studies	of	Harvard	University	(2013)		Figure	15	shows	that	the	change	in	share	of	households	renting	from	2004-2013	has	increased	in	every	age	group	except	for	those	aged	75	and	over.		Something	must	be	causing	this	increase	in	renters.		At	first	thought,	one	might	think	that	renting	is	a	cheaper	alternative,	but	that	is	not	necessarily	true.		According	to	Svenja	Gudell	(2016),	renters	are	paying	30%	of	their	income	towards	rent,	compared	to	the	15%	the	average	American	can	expect	to	pay	towards	a	monthly	mortgage	payment	on	a	typical	American	home.		So,	on	average,	raw	monthly	mortgage	payments	are	
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cheaper	than	raw	monthly	rental	payments.		The	raw	monthly	rental	payments	do	not	include	additional	payments	associated	with	renting,	such	as	upkeep,	renters’	insurance,	maintenance	fees,	and	amenities.		Also,	the	raw	monthly	mortgage	payments	do	not	include	additional	payments,	such	as	property	taxes	and	insurance.		Zillow	conducted	a	study	where	they	found	that	26%	of	renters	said	they	struggled	to	pay	their	rent,	or	that	their	rent	was	sometimes	difficult	to	pay	but	doable	(Terrazas,	2016).		However,	there	is	one	factor	that	may	make	rent	seem	more	affordable	to	the	average	American.		With	renting,	you	have	no	down	payment;	there	may	be	upfront	costs,	but	they	are	not	comparable	to	a	down	payment	on	a	home.			Since	rents	are	not	an	overall	cheap	alternative,	there	must	be	other	reasons	for	increasing	renters	in	America.		 In	2013,	the	Joint	Center	for	Housing	Studies	of	Harvard	University	(JCHS)	conducted	research	on	the	current	rental	market	in	the	United	States.		The	JCHS	(2013)	found	that	the	increase	in	rental	housing	was	the	result	of	four	factors:	wave	of	foreclosures,	economic	upheaval,	risks	of	homeownership,	and	renewed	appreciation	for	benefits	of	renting.		The	wave	of	foreclosures	displaced	many	homeowners	and	made	renting	more	accommodating,	while	the	economic	upheaval	strained	many	household	budgets,	which	turned	Americans	towards	renting	(JCHS,	2013).		When	the	home	prices	declined	so	rapidly	and	foreclosures	started	happening	in	2006	and	thereafter,	many	Americans	lost	faith	in	the	housing	market.		Americans	saw	firsthand	the	risks	of	homeownership:	the	potential	loss	of	wealth	from	falling	home	prices,	the	high	costs	of	relocating,	and	the	financial	and	personal	
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stress	that	can	be	caused	from	homeownership	(JCHS,	2013).		Figure	16	shows	in	more	detail	why	more	Americans	are	choosing	to	rent.				Figure	16:	Why	Many	Americans	Are	Choosing	to	Rent	
	Source:	JCHS	(2013)	
Figure	16	shows	that	renting	grants	many	benefits	to	Americans	that	they	believe	they	cannot	achieve	through	homeownership.		In	regards	to	our	current	residential	real	estate	market,	the	recent	turmoil	in	for-sale	housing	markets	and	the	broader	economy	has	created	a	favorable	alternative,	which	is	renting;	renting	seems	to	provide	a	sense	of	comfort	in	or	at	least	an	alternative	to	the	high	priced	risk	associated	with	homeownership	(JCHS,	2013).		 After	looking	into	homeownership	since	the	bursting	of	the	housing	bubble,	I	believe	that	a	change	in	demographics,	specifically	changing	attitudes	of	Millenials	
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and	increasing	renters,	has	contributed	to	the	United	States’	decline	in	homeownership.				
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Chapter	8:	Conclusion	
	 In	conclusion,	since	World	War	II,	there	have	been	many	factors	at	work	affecting	the	United	States’	homeownership	rates.		The	economy,	interest	rates,	and	government	policies	seem	to	act	in	an	expected	manner,	except	when	changing	demographics	are	occurring.				Immediately	following	World	War	II,	homeownership	drastically	increased,	due	to	built	up	demand,	a	thriving	economy,	and	government	policies.		The	increase	in	homeownership	lasted	all	the	way	until	the	major	economic	downturn	that	took	place	at	the	beginning	of	the	1980s.		The	resulting	decrease	in	homeownership	lasted	for	six	years	from	1980	until	1986.		The	decrease	in	homeownership	was	the	result	of	a	struggling	economy	and	high	interest	rates	that	resulted	in	unaffordable	housing.		The	decline	in	homeownership	ended	due	to	the	use	of	alternative	mortgage	options	and	lower	interest	rates;	and	shortly	after	a	housing	bubble	began	forming.		Along	with	increasing	home	prices,	homeownership	rates	saw	a	massive	increase	starting	in	the	late	1990s	due	to	many	factors:	monetary	policy,	adjustable-rate	mortgages,	and	irrational	exuberance.		Then,	once	the	bubble	burst,	the	United	States’	current	residential	real	estate	market	began	forming.		 Since	the	bubble	bursting	in	2006,	the	United	States	has	experienced	only	declines	in	homeownership.		So	far,	this	decline	has	spanned	ten	years;	the	United	States	has	not	seen	this	significant	of	a	decline	since	the	Great	Depression.	The	beginning	of	the	1980s	experienced	a	major	decline	in	homeownership	rates	but	not	quite	to	the	extent	of	our	current	decline.		Unlike	the	1980s,	when	low	interest	rates	helped	increase	homeownership,	our	current	low	interest	rates	have	not	helped	
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bolster	homeownership.		Also,	in	the	past,	government	policies	and	a	stable	economy	have	seemed	to	suggest	an	increase	in	homeownership,	but	currently	we	are	not	experiencing	an	increase	due	to	these	two	factors.		The	current	decline	is	attributed	to	changing	demographics,	which	has	also	been	observed	in	the	past	century.		Once,	after	World	War	II,	Americans	shifted	towards	the	suburbs,	which	helped	increase	homeownership	rates.		And	second,	baby	boomers	entering	the	housing	market	in	1980s	result	in	an	increase	in	homeownership.		In	contrast,	the	current	demographic	change	is	resulting	in	a	decrease	in	homeownership.		Therefore,	demographics	can	have	either	a	positive	or	negative	affect	on	homeownership.		Since	looking	at	homeownership	rates	since	the	Great	Depression,	there	are	obvious	factors,	such	as	the	economy,	interest	rates,	government	policies,	and	demographics,	which	do	affect	homeownership.		However,	demographics	seem	to	be	the	only	factor,	out	of	the	major	four	factors,	that	acts	in	an	unpredictable	way.		Therefore,	those	in	the	residential	real	estate	market	now	have	a	better	understanding	of	what	tends	to	influence	homeownership	in	the	United	States;	but	Americans’	changing	demographics	and	resulting	needs,	in	regards	to	housing,	will	always	need	to	be	put	into	consideration.			
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